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Abstract
We define constructive truth for arithmetic and for intuitionistic
analysis, and investigate its properties. We also prove that the set of
constructively true (first order) arithmetical statements is Π1
2
and Σ1
2
hard, and we conjecture it to be complete for second order arithmetic.
A statement is constructively true iff it is realized by a constructive
function under continuous function realizability.
1 Introduction
1.1 Historical Background
Being able to construct a mathematical object is more satisfying than simply
knowing it exists, and a branch of mathematics was developed with empha-
sis on construction. However, a satisfactory description of constructive truth
has previously eluded mathematicians. Some like L.E.J. Brouwer thought
that mathematics is a free activity of the mind, and hence subjective. Some
others confined themselves to recursive functions and analysis. Still others
emphasized constructive proof (as in Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov seman-
tics) over truth.
Constructive mathematics is as old as mathematics itself, and most
mathematics before the 19th century was constructive. Constructive math-
ematics was considered just ordinary mathematics and was done in classical
logic. In the early 20th century, Brouwer pioneered constructive mathemat-
ics, specifically intuitionism, as a distinct branch of mathematics with the
rules of logic weakened to ensure that non-constructive results are not prov-
able. Specifically, the law of the excluded middle A ∨ ¬A was omitted in
favor of weaker statements. However, Brouwer adopted a polemic style and
insisted on subjectivity of mathematics. As a consequence, his constructive
analysis was imprecise and difficult to use. Only later was the intuitionistic
logic formalized. Around 1950s and later, Russian mathematicians devel-
oped a different branch of constructive mathematics, namely constructive
recursive analysis. In constructive recursive analysis, every real number is
given by a recursive code and every answer must be a construction.
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A major development was Bishop’s Foundations of Constructive Analy-
sis [Bishop 1967], where he showed that much of mathematics can be done
constructively and without using controversial or classically incorrect princi-
ples. Bishop accomplished that by using mathematically relevant formaliza-
tions (among many classically but not constructively equivalent ones) and
by using additional assumptions (like uniform continuity) for his theorems.
Still, semantics of constructive mathematics remained unsatisfactory.
There is a qualitative leap from simply working in a constructive formal
system to knowing what is constructive truth. Semantics gives meaning to
symbol manipulations, explains why some rules are accepted while others
are not, makes it much easier to have intuition about the subject, and pro-
vides a way resolve the incompleteness in the formal system. Historically,
because of usability problems and unsatisfactory semantics, relatively few
mathematicians actually worked in constructive formal systems. Some se-
mantics was provided by Kripke models and related developments, but these
do not provide a notion of constructive truth. Different statements are true
at different nodes of a typical Kripke model.
For constructive recursive mathematics, semantics was provided through
Kleene’s recursive realizability (which is defined in this paper). However, re-
cursive realizability essentially forbids non-recursive functions, which makes
it too restrictive for ordinary mathematics. Later [Kleene 1965], Kleene
defined function realizability, which comes close to constructive truth. Un-
fortunately, Kleene’s function realizability became relatively obscure, and I
did not know its definition until this paper was essentially complete.
1.2 Motivation and Outline
My search for constructive truth started from the question, What do we
know about a statement (beyond its truth) from having a constructive proof
regardless of the constructive formal system used? The answer is that we
know a constructive witness to the statement. A statement is constructively
true iff it has a constructive witness.
Some constructivists may reject the notion that there is constructive
arithmetical truth which can be formally defined. For them, our quest can
be viewed in this way: If we have to formally define constructive truth, what
would be the definition? Besides, the mathematical results can be enjoyed
whether or not the reader accepts our philosophical claim.
Clearly, we cannot identify constructive truth with constructive proof
since there is no single privileged formal notion of constructive proof. Our
definition diverges from the thought of Brouwer and others, but only to the
extent necessary for basic properties of truth. Constructive truth resem-
bles recursive realizability, except that every constructively true arithmeti-
cal statement is true. In fact, our definition of witnessability (which we also
call continuous function realizability) agrees with Kleene’s function realiz-
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ability but for notational differences (we use sets rather than functions, and
our treatment of witnesses is more explicit).
In retrospect, defining the exact constructive content of implication is
the technical impediment to the definition of constructive truth. We have
to use real numbers to overcome the difficulty, which leads to the amazingly
high complexity of constructive arithmetical truth. However, the technical
difficulty was essentially overcome by Kleene, and the problem was more of
a philosophical one. Intuitionism as a philosophy rejects objective mathe-
matical truth, so constructive truth was not pursued. The result was a much
less usable intuitionistic analysis than it could have been.
The paper is mostly self-contained. Background information can be
found in articles “Intuitionistic Logic” and “Constructive Mathematics” in
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online); in the chapter “Aspects
of Constructive Mathematics” in the Handbook of Mathematical Logic; and
also in [Moschovakis 2005]. The latter defines function realizability.
The second section defines constructive arithmetical truth, and the third
section describes its basic properties. In the fourth section, we prove that
constructive arithmetical truth is Π12 and Σ
1
2 hard. For ease of understand-
ing, we build up to that result by presenting easier results first. We also
prove that for a large class of statements, constructive truth is Π11. In fifth
section, we consider a modification of constructive truth and prove that it
is Π11 complete. In the sixth section, which is independent of the fourth
and fifth sections, we define and analyze constructive truth for intuitionistic
analysis. For brevity and smoothness of flow, in that section we omit formal
proofs, but given enough details to make the proofs routine. That section
also discusses constructive reverse mathematics and concludes with an in-
dependence result. The final section discusses correctness of the definition
of constructive truth.
2 Definition of Constructive Truth
A statement is constructively true if it is true and there is a constructive wit-
ness to existential aspects of its truthfulness. Logical connectives are used
to designate which aspects are existential. Logically equivalent (in the clas-
sical sense) statements may have different designations, and thus different
requirements on the witness, which can make the statements constructively
inequivalent.
A witness must produce a certain output when given a certain input as
described below. A witness is constructive if there is a constructive mech-
anism for its operation; the standard and default meaning of this is that
the witness is computable, but other notions are possible. The stricter the
notion of being constructive, the more difficult it is for a statement to be
constructively true; the weakest possible notion is for (classical) truth.
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For readers who are familiar with Kleene’s function realizability, we note
that our definition of witnesses agrees up to recursive interconversion with
function realizability; and a statement is constructively true iff it is realized
by a recursive function. The agreement extends to constructive analysis.
However, here we present witnesses in a more explicit and readable syntactic
form.
The language consists of the arithmetical symbols ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘<’,
‘=’, logical symbols of ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’, ‘∃’, ‘∀’, and the modal operator
‘’ of constructive truth in the recursive sense. A formula is arithmetical
if it does not use ‘’. Quantifiers and ‘’ have the least possible scope.
Implication has lower precedence than other logical operators.
• A witness for A exists iff A is true.
• A witness for A must provide a standard code for a recursive witness
for A.
• A witness for ¬A or for an atomic formula is not required to do any-
thing (but only exists if the formula is true).
• A witness for A ∨B must choose A or B and provide a witness for it.
• A witness for A ∧B must provide witnesses for both A and B.
• A witness for ∃xA(x) must provide n and a witness for A(n).
• A witness for ∀xA(x) must when given n as input, provide a witness
for A(n).
• A witness for A → B must provide a witness for B whenever given a
witness for A.
Here A and B are formulas with an assignment of free variables. Techni-
cally, witnesses are real numbers (or arbitrary sets of integers) that specify
which output to give for each possible input and satisfy the above require-
ments. The real number codes a sequence of input-output pairs in arbitrary
order (and with arbitrary delay or whitespace), possibly omitting incorrect
inputs. Having a witness refers to the ability to query the digits of the real
number. W witnesses A → B iff for every X witnessing A, WX witnesses
B. Here W is viewed as a continuous function, and WX is W applied to X
(using whitespace in WX to make f : f(W,X) = WX total (and recursive);
for inappropriate X, WX might consist of just whitespace). The rest is a
formalization of the syntactic details (that should not affect constructive
truth).
Input and output are given in the order of decreasing scope; ‘∧’ and ‘∨’
are treated like quantifiers. For example, for ∀x∃y(x = 2∗ y ∨x = 2∗ y+1),
an input-output pair can be (25 : 12, 1). 25 is the input x; the output
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provides 12 as y, and uses 1 to choose the second disjunct (0 would indicate
the first disjunct; analogously with conjuncts). (25 : 12) is also an input-
output pair, but with insufficient output. (:) is the trivial pair (and is correct
here); (: 12) gives too much output. A sample witness for ∀x∃y y = 2 ∗ x is
“(:) (0 : 0) (1 : 2) (2 : 4) . . .”. Input does not affect output outside the scope.
For example, for ∀x∃y∀zP (x, y, z), y is a part of output rather than input
and may not depend on z.
For A → B, input consists of an initial segment of a witness for A
and input for B. Arbitrary output (of the right syntactic form) for the
consequent is permitted for false initial segments (including whenever A is
false). Segments that are too short (or incorrect) can be rejected in that
input-output pairs are omitted. However, for every witness for C, for every
tuple of witnesses used as input into C, for every appropriate numerical
input for C, some tuple of finite initial segments of the witnesses combined
with the numerical input is accepted.
Output is uniquely determined by the input and is preserved if we extend
the initial segments of the candidate witnesses for the antecedents (even for
false candidate witnesses, where the output can otherwise be arbitrary; also,
whitespace matters here for what constitutes an extension). (Alternatively,
we could have allowed multiple outputs as long as the witness follows through
and is accountable for each output. Any such witness can be converted into
a witness with unique outputs.)
The semantic content of an input-output pair for a statement is the
assertion (in classical logic) that the pair is correct. For example, for
∀x∃y y = x + 1 → ∀x∃y y = x + 2, the input-output pair (“(2:3) (3:4)”, 2:
4) has semantic content ∀x∃y y = x+1∧ 3 = 2+ 1∧ 4 = 3+ 1→ 4 = 2+ 2.
Equivalently, witnesses can be described in computational terms. Wit-
nesses are given as a black box or an oracle and need not be constructive.
When given a witness, you may give it input and will receive appropriate
output; you will get no other information. Multiple instances of a witness
can be run, and any instance can be copied. When requested a witness
(as input to a witness), you simply accept input and provide appropriate
output; you may give false output, but that may cause the instance of the
witness to enter an infinite loop or give arbitrary output. A witness may
take arbitrarily long to give an answer and may call appropriate witnesses
(for example, a witness to A → B may call a witness to A) an unlimited
number of times. A witness for a statement containing ‘→’ can also be
viewed as a functional of a higher type.
By running multiple instances of a witness W for A, we obtain the re-
sponse tree for W , from which we can obtain W as a real number. Note
that W has to meet the requirements for every path through the tree. (The
response tree specifies the behavior for every possible input.) For a different
notion, see Section 5 Narrow Constructive Truth.
Constructive truth for intuitionistic analysis is defined in Section 6. Re-
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cursive analysis can be interpreted in arithmetic and is not considered sep-
arately in this paper.
3 Basic Properties
3.1 Basic Properties
Some statements, such as ¬A, have no existential components (the witnesses
have nothing non-trivial to do) and are thus treated classically: ¬A↔ ¬A
and ¬A ↔ ¬¬¬A. ¬A may be viewed as an abbreviation of A → 0 = 1.
A∨B is constructively true iff A is constructively true or B is constructively
true; analogously with A ∧ B and (for integers) with ∃xA(x). ∀xA(x) is
constructively true iff for every n, A(n) is constructively true and uniformly
so, that is the witnesses can be constructed uniformly in n.
The requirement on witnesses for implication is precisely such that key
properties of implication are constructively true. A → B is constructively
weaker than ¬A ∨ B, which allows A → A to be constructively valid. If
A ∧ (A → B) is constructively true, then so is B. A ↔ B means (A →
B) ∧ (B → A), and ‘↔’ has the same precedence as ‘→’. As required,
constructive truth of A→ B is preserved if the notion of constructiveness is
broadened, which is why the witnesses for antecedents cannot be required
to be constructive.
Because the whitespace in witnesses can absorb time complexity, every
constructively true statement technically has a polynomial time computable
witness. The transformations on witnesses corresponding to the connectives
and quantifiers are also recursive (and hence polynomial-time computable).
For example, to convert a witness for ∀xA(x) into a witness for A(n), pick
all of the input-output pairs starting with n, and remove n from the inputs.
Like in the classical logic, every occurrence of a subformula is either
positive or negative. If A → B is constructively valid, then any positive
occurrence of A may be replaced B, and any negative occurrence of B may
be replaced by A, and the above is constructively true.
Intuitionistic predicate logic, Heyting arithmetic, and Markov’s prin-
ciple ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) ∧ ¬∀x¬A(x) → ∃xA(x) are constructively true.
∀x(¬¬A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) is constructively true iff A is decidable.
Similarly, (∀x(¬¬B(x) ∨ ¬B(x))→ ∀x(¬¬A(x) ∨ ¬A(x))) means A is
recursive in B.
Every statement A has the associated set of witnesses S(A). A → B is
constructively true iff there is a recursive mapping that is total on S(A) and
maps S(A) into S(B).
Conjunction and disjunction are not strictly necessary since with some
modifications to the formula, they may be replaced by the universal and
existential quantifier, respectively.
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The property of being a constructive witness is Π02 above the (construc-
tive) complexity of blocks that start with negation or top-level implication.
Thus, constructive truth is Σ03 above the complexity of such blocks. More-
over, ∀x∃yφ(x, y)↔ ∃n∀x({n}(x) exists ∧φ(x, {n}(x))) is constructively
valid, and analogously with more quantifiers. Here {n}(x) is the output of
the nth Turing machine with input x when that machine halts.
Also, a (constructively) Σ03 statement is true iff it is constructively true.
In fact, φ↔ φ is constructively valid for (constructively) Σ03 φ.
Recursive realizability, or just realizability, is like constructive truth ex-
cept that witnesses must be given as standard codes for partial recursive
functions. A statement is realizable iff it has a witness in this sense. The re-
alizability interpretation corresponds to inserting ‘’ at every relevant place,
that is in front of the statement and antecedents and after ‘¬’. For every
statement A, A or ¬A is realizable (as is A ∨ ¬A). The set of realizable
sentences is a consistent completion of some constructive formal systems;
it has the same Turing degree as the truth predicate for arithmetic. In-
tuitionistic predicate logic, Heyting arithmetic, and Markov’s principle are
realizable. Some realizable statements are false; an example is “not every
partial recursive function is either defined or undefined at zero”. Extended
Church Thesis is the realizable assertion (actually, a schema) that truth
equals realizability.
A constructive proof provides a number and demonstrates that the num-
ber codes a constructive witness. (However, even when the constructive
proof is short, an actual computation of say which disjunct is true may
be unfeasibly long.) A true constructive formal system is a formal system
in which only constructively true statements are derivable, and in which
derivations can be constructively converted into witnesses for constructive
truth. When one is more interested in the witnesses than in the truth, using
a constructive formal system may be a good way to manage complexity. For
example, constructive formal systems have applications in computer science
since algorithms can be “read off” constructive proofs. When one is more
interested in realizability than in truth, a constructive formal system that
proves false statements but does not prove unrealizable statements may be
useful. However, the savings have to be balanced against the difficulty of
not using some logical truths; and to avoid contradiction, one must always
note when “A” is used as a shorthand for “A is realizable”.
3.2 An Abstract Theory of Constructive Truth
Constructive truth acts as a necessity operator in intuitionistic modal logic.
If the language is treated constructively, then A⇒ A is admissible as a rule
of inference. We define the abstract theory of ‘’ to consist of intuitionistic
predicate logic, rule A ⇒ A, and axioms (A → B) → (A → B),
A → A, A → A, ¬A → ¬A, (A ∨ B) → A ∨ B, and
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∃xA(x)→ ∃xA(x). Constructive arithmetical truth satisfies the theory.
In the above, we have assumed that every element is constructive (and
given as a construction); see Section 6 for a treatment of non-constructive
elements. The theory proves (A ∧ B) ↔ A ∧ B, (A ∨ B) ↔ A ∨
B, ∃xA(x) ↔ ∃xA(x), and ∀xA(x) → ∀xA(x); but ¬¬A → A
need not be constructively valid, that is the universal closure need not be
constructively true.
The theory seems to capture the essence of the constructive truth op-
erator relative to the underlying logic. However, intuitionistic logic has
natural extensions. If the interpretation of ‘∀’ is compatible with the clas-
sical one (as is the case here), then ∀x¬¬A(x)→ ¬¬∀xA(x) can be added.
If the domain is constructively enumerable and unbounded searches can be
performed (as is also the case with constructive arithmetical truth), then
∀x(A(x)∨B(x))∧¬∀xB(x)→ ∃xA(x) can be added. However, this princi-
ple can fail if the domain consists of say codes for total recursive functions
or if we impose time limits on computations. Other principles can be added,
but they should be constructive so that the rule A⇒ A can be retained.
An abstract theory of constructive knowledge consists of the abstract
theory of ‘’ except for ¬A → ¬A but with additional axioms as appro-
priate. A would stand for “A is constructively knowable”. One notion of
constructive knowledge is that a witness for PA codes a witness for A and
a proof (in a sufficiently strong formal system) that the code witnesses A.
Another interesting notion of constructive knowledge includes ¬¬A → A
(and hence ∀x(¬¬A(x)→ A(x))).
4 Complexity of Constructive Truth
A Π11 formula is one that can be presented in the form ∀Xφ where φ is
arithmetical, allowing the use of the set of integers X as a predicate. Thus,
a statement is Π11 if it is equivalent to a statement that a particular recursive
(or arithmetical, or polynomial time computable) partial order (or total
order) is well-founded.
Theorem 1: Constructive arithmetical truth is Π11 hard.
Proof: Let x = (x0, x1, x2, . . .) be arithmetical and such that for every n, xn
(which is a set of natural numbers) is not recursive in (x0, x1, x2, . . .)
with xn replaced by 0. Such x exists by standard results in recursion
theory. For example, every real number Cohen generic over recursive
sets can be split into infinitely many mutually generic predicates xn.
Let P be ∀i(¬¬xn(i)∨¬xn(i)). We have ¬∃n(∀m 6= nP (m)→ P (n)).
Let T be a recursive tree of integer sequences under extension. We
claim that T is well-founded iff (∀n∃s(sequence s has length n∧ s ∈
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T ∧ P (s)) → ∃s∃t(s is incompatible with t ∧ P (s) ∧ P (t))). If T
is well-founded, then we simply wait until incompatible s and t are
given, and then copy the witnesses for P (s) and P (t). If T is not well-
founded, then a “bad” witness for the antecedent will start to provide
an infinite path through T and then once we commit to incompatible
s and t, provide witnesses for every P except for P (s) or for P (t).
The proof shows that constructive truth for arithmetical statements of
the form A → B where A and B are without ‘→’ is Π11 complete. Also, by
Proposition 3 (below), constructive truth for ‘∃’-free statements is Π11 hard.
Transfinite induction for P on ‘≺’, TI(P, ≺) asserts ∀n(∀m ≺ nP (m)→
P (n))→ ∀nP (n).
Proposition 2: For every formula P and well-founded relation ‘≺’, TI(P,
≺).
Proof: To get a witness for ∀nP (n), request a witness for ∀m ≺ nP (m)→
P (n) for every n. Then, fulfill all requests for witnesses for P (m) as
witnesses become available. By induction on the rank of n, for every n,
a witness for P (n) will be provided. Witnesses for m ≺ n are provided
in ∀m(m ≺ n→ P (m)), so ‘≺’ need not be recursive.
Conversely, a form of constructive induction implies well-foundness.
Proposition 3: If ‘≺’ is a recursive strict partial-order given as such, and R
is a universal Π01 predicate, then “≺ is well-founded”↔ ∀nTI(R(n)∨
¬R(n),≺).
Proof: An input-output pair for TI(R(n)∨¬R(n),≺) can be converted into
a finite boolean combination of {R(n, 0), R(n, 1), R(n, 2), . . .} assert-
ing “input implies output”. For a witness S, every such combination
included must be true. We show that if ‘≺’ is ill-founded, then some
combination included is not tautological. Let a0 ≻ a1 ≻ a2 ≻ . . .
be infinite and consider the following witness T to the antecedent:
For every i, require the correct truth-value of R(n, ai+1) before giv-
ing away R(n, ai); other than that, answer every R(n,m). Some
(segment of T , (a0, truth value of ¬R(n, a0)) is included in S, but
any such combination is non-tautological. Now, from any witness to
∀nTI(R(n) ∨ ¬R(n),≺), a non-tautological combination of (R(n, i))i
can be extracted for every n, so by universality of R, the witness is
non-recursive, which completes the proof.
In essence, the proof of Proposition 3 uses quantification over all Π01
predicates to approximate the idealized unknowable predicate G: A con-
structive witness for a statement using ‘G’ must work regardless of which
set is {n : G(n)}. The same idea is used to prove the next theorem.
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Theorem 4: Constructive arithmetical truth is Σ11 hard.
Proof: Let T be a recursive tree of integer sequences under extension. Let
R be a universal Π01 predicate, and P (a, b) be R(a, b) ∨ ¬R(a, b). We
prove that T is ill-founded iff: ∀n((∀l∃s(sequence s has length l∧s ∈
T ∧ P (n, s)) → ∃s∃t(s is incompatible with t ∧ P (n, s) ∧ P (n, t))) →
S(n)), where S(n) asserts “there is a non-tautological finite boolean
combination of {R(n, 0), R(n, 1), R(n, 2), . . .} that is not false.” By
universality of R, we have ¬∀nS(n). If T is well-founded, then the
antecedent has a recursive witness, and hence the full statement is not
constructively true. On the other hand, if T is not well-founded, then
any witness for the antecedent will have to respond to some branch s
of the tree, and hence divulge a statement of the form ∀t(t is a sub-
sequence of s)(¬)R(n, t) → (¬)R(n, u), where u is not a subsequence
of s. Here ‘(¬)’ means that ‘¬’ can independently be either present
or absent (but the statement must specify when ‘¬’ is present). Now,
that statement is not a tautology and hence witnesses S(n).
In contrast to theorems 1 and 4, we have the following theorem, which
shows that in terms of the number of implications, the complexity of the
formulas used in the proofs of the theorems above is optimal.
Theorem 5: Let φ be arithmetical and such that for every A → B in φ,
A uses neither ‘→’ nor ‘∃’, but allowing bounded ‘∃’. (Negations do
not count as implications.) Then, φ is constructively equivalent to
an arithmetical formula.
Proof Sketch: φ ↔ ∃n “n is a witness to φ”. For statements with-
out ‘→’, strengthen the notion of witnesses by requiring that answers
be given in order and without whitespace. Any witness can be so
strengthened, so constructive truth is unaffected, and we show that
under this change, being a witness to φ is arithmetical. W witnesses
φ iff (W has the right syntactic form and) for every numerical input
into φ for all witnesses input into φ, appropriate output is given. X
witnesses A (in the strengthened sense) where A is an antecedent in-
side φ iff every initial segment of X is correct. By compactness, W
witnesses φ iff for every numerical input into φ, there is a finite tree
of (finite) witness inputs into φ such that W gives appropriate and
complete numerical output for every witness input outside the finite
tree (allowing false or incomplete output for false input). The above
formula is arithmetical, which completes the proof.
Corollary to the Proof: Constructive truth for arithmetical statements
for which every antecedent φ is as φ is in the theorem is Π11.
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We conjecture constructive arithmetical truth to be complete for second
order arithmetic and have the following partial results:
Proposition 6: The relation of being a witness is complete for second order
arithmetic.
Proof: By inspection, for every φ, being a witness to φ is definable in
second order arithmetic. Let A0 be ∀x∃y 0 = 0, and An+1 be An →
(0 = 0∨ 0 = 0). (By coding in whitespace, we could even have started
with A−1 as 0 = 0 ∨ 0 = 0, or without using whitespace, A−1 as
∀x(0 = 0 ∨ 0 = 0).) We define a recursive function f such that for
every infinite binary sequence X and every φ given as Π1n (n > 0) but
not as Π1n−1, φ(X) holds iff f(“φ”, X) is a witness to An. If φ is Π
1
1,
convert it to an assertion that a particular recursive-in-X relation is
well-founded. Use the witness for the antecedent to guess an infinite
descending path, and when that fails, give a witness to the consequent.
Also, use additional delays to code X into f(“φ”, X). If φ is Π1n+1 (but
not Π1n or Π
1
1), then convert it to ∀Y ψ(X join Y ) where ψ is Σ
1
n, and
delay giving a witness to the consequent for as long as the candidate
witness for the antecedent is f(“¬ψ”, X join Y).
Theorem 7: Constructive arithmetical truth is is Π12 and Σ
1
2 hard.
Proof: We build on the proofs of Theorem 4 and Proposition 6. As in
Theorem 4, we quantify over all Π01 predicates. Let ‘R’ be a symbol
for a Π01 predicate. For simplicity, we present our statements using R,
and interpret D as ∀nD(R′n) where R
′ is a universal Π01 predicate.
Let P (n) beR(n)∨¬R(n). The Π12 hard formula D will have D = A∧
B → C. A will assert ∀n∃s(sequence s has length n∧ s ∈ T ∧P (s))→
∃s∃t(s is incompatible with t ∧ P (s) ∧ P (t)), where T is the tree of
integer sequences that is effectively coded (say, as a primitive recursive
predicate) by the free variable of A, and with sequences coded by odd
natural numbers. B asserts ∀n(P (4n) ∨ P (4n + 2)). B is used as a
second order universal quantifier; witnesses for B code real numbers
through choices of 4n or 4n + 2. C states ∃s∃u(∀n(n in sequence
s)P (2n)∧ sequence u is not a subsequence of s ∧(∀t(t is a subsequence
of s)(¬)R(t)→ (¬)R(u))).
We claim that D holds iff for every witness to B, there is an infinite
path through T such that for every n in the path, P (2n) is given by
the witness. To see that the claim implies the theorem, note that the
statement is Π12 complete (as a function of the parameter of A). For Σ
1
2
hardness, let E be D → “there is a true non-tautological finite boolean
combination of {R(0), R(1), R(2), . . .}”. Clearly, by universality of R,
E → ¬D, and in the proof of the claim, we will show ¬D→ E.
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Now, consider a witness X to B. Every witness to A will have to
respond to every infinite path through T corresponding to X. If the
Π12 statement is true, then such a path exists and hence (like in the
proof of Theorem 4), by reading the witness for A, one can extract the
information required for C. If the Π12 statement is false, let X be a
counter-example witness for B. A “bad” witness Y for A will require
correct answers to P and will delay giving away incompatible elements
until the path used as input into A is past the point where some P (2n)
is not given by X, and then give out P (s) and P (t) for incompatible
s and t that are independent of the path. For every witness Z to D,
the input-output pair corresponding to X and Y is not tautological.
Thus, a non-tautological input-output pair can be extracted from Z
through complete search, which completes the proof.
Question: What is the complexity of constructive arithmetical truth?
We expect that the proof of Theorem 7 can be generalized to prove that
constructive arithmetical truth is complete for second order arithmetic. For
Π1n+1 hardness, let An+1 = (An ∧Bn → Cn) with A1 = A, Bn analogous to
B (but using a different domain for each n), and Cn asserting existence of
a true non-tautological combination of a certain type. However, there are
combinatorial difficulties in actually stating a correct Cn, so we do not know
how to prove the conjecture.
We note that An use the optimal number of implications since construc-
tive truth for statements with implication nesting depth n > 0 (or depth
n+ 1 for statements corresponding to Theorem 5) is Π1n.
Question: Are there arithmetical statements not constructively equivalent
to ‘∃’-free ones?
Probably, the answer is yes and ∃nP (n) is such a statement where P is as
in Theorem 1. On the other hand, we expect that every φ is constructively
equivalent to ψ where ψ uses neither ‘∃’ nor ‘’. If A(n) is equivalent
to “n is a witness to φ”, then φ is equivalent to ∃nA(n) and may be
equivalent to (∀n(A(n) → B) → B) for appropriate B. A (and B) can
likely be chosen without ‘’ and ‘∃’.
5 Narrow Constructive Truth
Narrow constructive truth is a particular modification of constructive truth
in which witnesses are not completely given. A witness for narrow construc-
tive truth provides a code for a recursive interactive function such that for
every possible interaction, the witness requirements are met. The meeting
of requirements is defined inductively on the complexity of the formula. If A
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is false, then the requirements for A are immediately violated. For A→ B,
multiple numbered instances can be launched, and different choices for the
candidate witness for A require different instances. A new instance may
copy the input and output (but not the internal state) from any point of an
existing instance (it is unclear if omitting this provision would change which
statements are narrow constructively true). Every instance for A→ B must
meet the requirements for B for as long as the requirements for A are met,
including in the limit (that is at time infinity). If every instance meets the
requirements, then the requirements for A→ B are met even if answers are
omitted along some path where the copying was done infinitely many times.
For other connectives, the meeting of requirements is as usual. For example,
in A ∨B, one must choose A or B, and then meet the requirements for the
choice. Failure to choose violates the requirements at infinity but not at any
finite time.
Narrow constructive truth is similar to constructive truth, with the dif-
ference limited to statements with implications inside antecedents. It satis-
fies all of the basic properties listed (except for the description of A → B
in terms of mappings), and theorems 1, 2, 3, and 5. Narrow constructive
truth implies constructive truth for statements without antecedents inside
antecedents inside antecedents, and perhaps for all arithmetical statements.
For this section only, ‘’ represents narrow constructive truth.
A key distinguishing feature of narrow constructive truth is that for A
and C without ‘→’, ((A → B) → C) ∧ ¬A ∧ ¬¬B → C is narrow
constructively valid (equivalently, constructively valid).
Theorem 8: Narrow constructive arithmetical truth is Π11 complete.
Proof: By the proof of Theorem 1, narrow constructive truth is Π11 hard.
To see that it (and the corresponding notion of witnesses) is Π11, a
statement is narrow constructively true iff there is an integer (coding
the narrow constructive witness) such that for every real number in-
teracting with and trying to refute the alleged constructive witness,
the witness requirements are met. The meeting of requirements is
hyperarithmetically definable.
Thus, by using a universal Π11 formula, we can find a “universal” arith-
metical formula φ such that for every arithmetical sentence ψ, φ(‘ψ’) iff
ψ. This does not contradict undefinability of truth since for some ‘ψ’,
φ(‘ψ’)→ ψ is false.
The reasoning can be used to compute the expressive power of the full
language, which allows nesting of the narrow constructive truth operator. A
hyperjump of X is essentially the set of (standard codes for) well-founded
relations that are recursive in X. For every natural number n, there is a
formula φ that only uses ‘’ n times, such that ∀x(φ(‘ψ(x)’)↔ ψ(x))
(and hence φ(‘ψ’) ↔ ψ if ‘ψ’ is a statement) whenever ‘ψ’ has at most
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n nested ‘’; and {x : φ(x)} has the same complexity (even under one-
to-one polynomial time reducibility) as the (n+1)th hyperjump of 0. The
proof is by induction on n, and is analogous to the proof of Theorem 8. The
proof also shows that for expressible P and φ, “P is a witness to φ” is also
expressible.
6 Constructive Truth for Analysis
6.1 Prelude and Definition
Before defining constructive analysis, we note that analysis can be inter-
preted in second order arithmetic. Analysis deals not with arbitrary func-
tions but continuous and other reasonable functions, and these can be rep-
resented by real numbers. Under an appropriate representation, the the-
orems of analysis are almost all Π13, and are usually Π
1
2. Moreover, most
of the Π12 theorems have a natural Π
1
1 strengthening by requiring that
in ∀X∃Y φ(X,Y ) Y is arithmetical in X. Similarly, most Π13 theorems
∀X∃Y ∀Zφ(X,Y,Z) in analysis have a Π12 strengthening by requiring Y to
be recursive in a finite hyperjump of X. Thus, analysis can essentially be
interpreted through constructive truth in arithmetic. Philosophically, one
can argue that natural numbers and constructive arithmetical truth are ba-
sic, so the high complexity of constructive arithmetical truth provides an
(additional) ontological basis for analysis.
We use the language of second order arithmetic. Capital letters represent
sets of natural numbers. Free variables need not be shown in schemas.
While there are different notions of constructive analysis, prominent
among them is Brouwer’s intuitionistic analysis. Under it, infinite binary
sequences are given not as completed objects, but as a process that gives
out zeroes and ones. Under the concept of choice sequences, we can make
completely arbitrary choices as which natural numbers belong to a choice se-
quence X. We construe this to mean that any real number can be a choice
sequence. Thus, the domain will include all sets of natural numbers (see
Section 7 for discussion). Other approaches treat choice sequences either as
a figure of speech or as a fundamentally non-classical construct. Also since
the sets represent real numbers rather than being a shorthand for arbitrary
properties, we will have ∀X∀n(X(n) ∨ ¬X(n)).
Answers must be given in finite time rather than after the process is
completed. Therefore, we reinterpret ∀X to mean for all X and with answers
given continuously in X. Under this view, every function is continuous on
its domain, and ∀X(X = 0 ∨ ¬X = 0) is false since one cannot always
decide whether X = 0 by looking at only a finite segment of X. Since
the statements are not treated classically, this is not a contradiction. We
use W (φ), φ is witnessable, for this interpretation of φ. We define “φ is
continuous function realizable” to mean W (φ).
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We formally define witnesses like in Section 2, except that being witness-
able need not match classical truth. However, we do haveW (¬φ)↔ ¬W (φ).
Input in input-output pairs includes initial segments of the sequences for the
second order universal quantifiers, and output includes initial segments of
the sequences for the existential quantifiers. W witnesses ∀Xφ(X) iff for
all X, WX witnesses φ(X). As in Section 2, WX is obtained from W be
selecting input-output pairs corresponding to X and and removing X from
input. W witnesses ∃Xφ(X) iff W provides arbitrarily long initial segments
for a single X, and a witness for φ(X), but not initial segments incompatible
with X. Treatment of other connectives (except ‘’) is unchanged.
Existence of non-constructive reals requires a change in the treatment
of ‘’. A witness for Sφ provides a standard code for a recursive in S
witness to CLS(φ) where CLS is the universal closure except for first order
variables and for variables in S. S is written as a list of second order variable
symbols and is omitted when empty. S is treated as a set; for example,
X,Y φ ↔ Y,Y,Xφ. Also, the semantics of ‘’ is definable in second order
arithmetic, so we can treat ‘’ not as a primitive symbol but as a particular
transformation of formulas.
6.2 Basic Properties
To define an abstract theory of Sφ, we can add ‘≤c’ with S ≤c T meaning
S can be constructed from T . We allow ≤c to act on finite sets of elements,
but with each element listed. We can axiomatize the theory by using the
abstract theory of ‘’ for every S (except that in ¬A→ S¬A, we require
S to include all free second order variables of A), properties of ≤c (reflexivity,
transitivity, S, T being the ≤c-least upper bound of S and T , and the empty
set being the ≤c-least element (up to ≤c equivalence)), Sφ→ S∀Xφ (X
not in S), S ≤c T → (Sφ → Tφ) (no element of S\T is free in φ), and
S∃Xφ→ ∃X ≤c S S,Xφ (X not in S). Our constructive analysis satisfies
additional properties including pairing and φ→ ∃XS,Xφ (completeness for
witnessability; here S includes all free second order variables of φ), and in
it, S ≤c T means S is recursive in T .
Because of continuity (which is classically false) and compactness of 2N ,
we even have (S∀Xφ↔ ∀XS,Xφ) (X not in S).
The entire discussion of Sections 3-5 generalizes to formulas with an
arbitrary second order parameter X by replacing recursive with recursive in
X and analogously replacing Π01 and other notions, and using X in place
of .
We note that a witness for ∀X(φ(X) → ψ(X)) is simply a code for
continuous function f such that if Y is a witness to φ(X), then f(X,Y ) is a
witness to ψ(X). (Because we allow whitespace in witnesses, we can require
f to be total.)
Formulas without ‘∃’ and ‘∨’ (and, but this is unnecessary here, with
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all atomic formulas negated) are called negative formulas and are treated
classically. Every formula is classically equivalent to a negative one, so
classical analysis can be interpreted in the constructive one. Conversely, the
relation of being a witness is definable in analysis, so constructive analysis
can be interpreted in the classical one.
Constructively, we define W (φ) as ∃X “X is a witness to φ”, where the
quoted statement is negative. We have (φ ↔ W (φ)), so constructively,
every formula is equivalent ∃X “a negative formula”, and every negation
equivalent to a negative formula. We expect that every Sφ is constructively
equivalent to Sψ for an arithmetical ψ without ‘∃’.
Because the relation of being a witness is definable, we can define addi-
tional connectives by specifying witness requirements in terms of witnesses
for the constituent formulas. We define a weak or non-constructive ‘or’ by:
A witness for A ∨w B must provide X and Y such that X witnesses A or
Y witnesses B. The following are constructively valid: A ∨w B ↔ B ∨w A,
A ∨w (B ∨w C) ↔ (A ∨w B) ∨w C, ¬A ∨w ¬¬A, A ∨ B → A ∨w B,
(A ∨w B) ∧ ¬B → A, (B → C)→ (A ∨w B → A ∨w C), ∀X(¬A(X)→
B(X)) ∨w C ↔ ∀X(¬A(X) → B(X) ∨w C) (and hence A ∧ B ∨w C ↔
(A∨w C)∧ (B ∨w C)), S(A∨w B)→ SA∨w SB, and (because of our
particular treatment of witnesses) (A ∨w B → SC) ∧ ¬¬(A ∧B)→ SC,
but not (A∨wA)→ A nor A∨wA→ (A∨wA). ‘∨w’ is the strongest
(definable) connective satisfying ((¬A→ B) ∧ (¬¬A→ C)→ B ∨w C).
A generalization of ‘∨w’ is given by: A witness for ∃wnA(n) must pro-
vide X0,X1,X2, . . . such that for some n, Xn witnesses A(n). The quan-
tifier ∃w satisfies the analogues of all of the above properties of ‘∨w’, and
also S∃wnA ↔ ¬¬SA (n not free in A). For example, ∀n(A → B) →
(∃wnA → ∃wnB) is constructively valid, which means that ∃w is non-
modal and monotonic. A formula φ(..) is non-modal iff for all A and B,
Clφ(A↔ B)→ (φ(A)↔ φ(B)) is constructively valid, where Clφ(C) is the
universal closure for variables free in C that are not free in φ(C).
We can also formalize the unknowable predicate G by treating ∀Gφ(G)
as ∀Xφ(G) where G(m) is “{n : (m,n) ∈ X} is not finite” and X is not
otherwise used in φ.
A constructive system for analysis can be defined as one in which proofs
of φ can be constructively (and uniformly in φ) converted into (constructive)
witnesses for the universal closure of φ. Continuous function realizability can
also be treated classically, but then one would not have W (φ) to W (∀Xφ)
as a rule of inference.
If φ is false, then W (φ) can only hold if φ has a negative occurrence
of ∀XA(X) with A containing ‘∃’ or ‘∨’ not in the scope of an antecedent
(or negation) inside A (X can be any second order variable). Thus, we
can form a classically correct subsystem by including all derivable (or wit-
nessable) formulas not of this type, and using classically correct principles
for other formulas. In constructivizing theorems of analysis, there is usu-
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ally no problem in avoiding that type of formulas. Principles that are both
classically and constructively correct include induction, transfinite induc-
tion, countable choice, and dependent choice. Apparently, even adding
¬¬∀X(A(X) ∨ ¬A(X)) will result (even in the presence of the above prin-
ciples) in a system that is constructive with respect to formulas φ in which
every positive (in φ) occurrence of ∀X that is inside an antecedent or nega-
tion is part of ‘∀X¬’.
6.3 Development of Constructive Analysis
A key constructively valid principle is countable choice ∀n∃Xφ(X,n) →
∃X∀nφ(Xn, n). Countable choice is a rather strong principle and implies
constructivized comprehension: ∀n(φ(n)∨¬φ(n))↔ ∃X∀n(n ∈ X ↔ φ(n))
(X not free in φ). In combination with ¬¬∀n(φ(n) ∨ ¬φ(n)) (which is also
constructively valid), constructivized comprehension is quite powerful and
implies the negative form of full comprehension. Constructively, we also
have transfinite induction ¬∃ (an infinite ≺-descending path)→TI(φ,≺) for
all formulas ≺ and φ. We also have Markov’s principle, which simplifies to
∀X(¬∀n¬X(n)→ ∃nX(n)).
We quantify over real numbers, continuous functions, and infinite se-
quences of integers (points in the Baire space) by using their effective bi-
nary codes and writing for example ∀X(“X codes an infinite sequence of
integers” → φ(X)). A real number is coded by a nested sequence of in-
tervals with rational endpoints. By using a conservative and essentially
definitional extension, one can also quantify over real numbers (and open
sets and continuous functions) directly rather than through coding.
Constructively, we have the continuity principle ∀X∃Y φ(X,Y ) ↔
∃(continuous f)∀Xφ(X, f(X)), and analogously with more quantifiers. This
also holds for quantification over the Baire space NN . However, as stated
the principle would fail for real numbers and should be modified to use ∃!Y
(here, the uniqueness is for the real number coded by Y rather than the
code Y ). This is needed because different sequences can denote the same
real number.
In contrast to arithmetic, many basic theorems of analysis are not con-
structively true (except in the negative form), and most of those that are true
have to be stated carefully. Clearly, constructive analysis should be meant
to complement rather than replace classical analysis. On the other hand,
many non-constructive theorems have constructive versions. For example,
the following is a constructive version of the intermediate value theorem: If
f is a continuous function (on real numbers) that has both a positive and a
negative value, and if, for no interval of positive length, f vanishes on every
point of the interval, then f has a zero.
It is crucial that this theorem and other theorems in analysis are stated
as implications rather than disjunctions. One generally cannot decide from
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the code whether the conditions of the theorem apply. However, given the
conditions, the construction must succeed. A major reason to study con-
structive analysis is that it gives effective versions of theorems in analysis.
The added condition for the constructive intermediate value theorem may
sound strange, but the point is that under these conditions we can actually
compute a zero of f and to do so uniformly in f .
Constructively, it is not the case the every bounded monotonic sequence
of real numbers has a limit. To make the theorem constructively true we
could include existence of the Turing jump of the sequence (or a certain
much weaker property) as a condition. A crucial substitute that we do have
is compactness of the unit interval: Every (countable) open cover has a
finite subcover. Note that the compactness fails in recursive analysis, and
the difference is that we require our continuous functions to be continuous
even at non-recursive real numbers. The compactness is a consequence of the
Fan Theorem, also called constructive Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma. An equivalent
of the constructive Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma is: Every countable theory that
does not have a model (with a complete diagram) has an inconsistency.
Most consequences of the Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma in analysis rely only on
the constructively true form, so in terms of reverse mathematics, construc-
tive analysis corresponds more closely to WKL than to RCA. For example,
even constructively, continuity implies uniform continuity for functions from
a complete totally bounded metric space.
6.4 Constructive Reverse Mathematics
Constructive reverse mathematics analyzes formal relationships between
constructively true statements. Here, the emphasis is on deriving strong
principles in weak theories.
Every constructive theory S has its classical counterpart T consisting of
first order logic and negative theorems of S. Conversely, every theory S sat-
isfying ED and containing intuitionistic RCA0 and φ↔ W (φ) is determined
by its classical counterpart T . RCA0 consists of basic arithmetic, Σ
0
1 induc-
tion and recursive comprehension. ED stands for explicit definability, and
this form of ED is sufficient: If S proves a sentence ∃Xφ(X), then for some
n, S proves ∃X“the nth Turing machine outputsX and φ(X)”. Because any
constructive proof can be recursively converted into such a recursive code,
any reasonably closed constructive system satisfies ED. For any classical T
containing RCA0, the (for sound T , constructive) counterpart S proves a
sentence φ iff for some n, T proves “n witnesses φ”. S can be axiomatized
by intuitionistic RCA0 + φ↔W (φ) + negative translation of T . S satisfies
(the above form of) ED and is conservative over T for negative formulas.
(ED is most often stated to imply Σ01 soundness for consistent S, but the
above form of ED allows us to state the general correspondence between S
and T .)
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Constructive analysis can be done in a weak formal system. Classical
mathematics in weak systems is developed in [Simpson 1999], and doing con-
structive mathematics is mostly analogous. Many results can be proved even
in intuitionistic RCA0 + φ↔W (φ). The system is strong enough to prove
the full continuity principle for Baire space, which implies countable choice
and hence constructivized comprehension. On the other hand, the system is
weak enough to be consistent with “every real number is not not recursive”,
an assertion that would turn our analysis into an analogue of constructive
recursive analysis except that recursive codes cannot be extracted from real
numbers.
Because of Σ01 induction, the continuity principle (for Baire space)
also implies a form of dependent choice: ∀X∃Y φ(X,Y ) → ∃X(X0 =
0 ∧ ∀nφ(Xn,Xn+1)) where X and Y range of the Baire space (this im-
plies countable choice and is classically correct). Over intuitionistic RCA0
+ φ↔ W (φ), the (constructively) stronger ∃Xφ(0,X) ∧ ∀X(∃Zφ(Z,X) →
∃Y φ(X,Y ))→ ∃X(X0 = 0∧ ∀nφ(Xn,Xn+1)) is equivalent to full induction
(equivalently, induction for negative formulas).
Analysis can be developed in intuitionistic RCA0 by using added as-
sumptions about functions such as having a modulus of uniform continuity.
Bishop’s analysis can essentially be carried out in intuitionistic RCA0 +
Countable Choice; and the use of countable choice can likely be eliminated
by replacing it with recursive comprehension, and by using ∃X∀nφ(Xn, n)
rather than ∀n∃Xφ(X,n) in theorems and definitions (and when appropri-
ate, analogously replacing ∀m∃nφ(m,n)).
The schema φ ↔ W (φ) is actually equivalent over intuitionistic RCA0
to Markov’s Principle ∀X(¬∀n¬X(n) → ∃nX(n)) plus generalized con-
tinuity principle: ∀X(¬φ(X) → ∃Y ψ(X,Y )) → ∃(continuous partial
f)∀X(¬φ(X) →“f(X) is defined” ∧ψ(X, f(X))). The proof of φ ↔ W (φ)
is by induction on the complexity of φ. Markov’s principle follows from
φ↔W (φ) because of the way W (φ) is formulated.
A classically correct subsystem of intuitionistic RCA0 + φ ↔ W (φ) is
intuitionistic RCA0 +Markov’s Principle + Countable Choice. Intuitionistic
RCA0 + φ↔W (φ) is conservative over the subsystem for formulas in which
every negative occurrence of ‘∀X’ classical (that is (provably) replaceable
by ‘∀X¬¬’). (The proof is be showing W (φ) → φ for these formulas.)
Moreover, countable choice is unneeded for formulas with every negative
occurrence of ‘∀’ classical. By extension, the conservation result also holds
in the presence of additional negative axioms. This way constructive analysis
can be effectively done even in a classically correct subsystem. Note that
while countable choice is classically a rather strong principle, constructively
it can be part of a weak formal system.
Most constructive results can actually be proved in just the construc-
tive counterpart of WKL0, that is in intuitionistic RCA0 + φ ↔ W (φ)
+ constructive Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma. The system proves compactness of
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the unit interval and results that follow from the compactness, including
for example, the constructive intermediate value theorem. (That theorem
is equivalent over intuitionistic RCA0 to Markov’s principle plus construc-
tive Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma. In fact, most constructive theorems relying on
compactness are equivalent over RCA0 + φ ↔ W (φ) to constructive Weak
Ko¨nig’s Lemma.) Still, the system is weak enough to be Π02 conservative over
primitive recursive arithmetic and to be consistent with “not every Turing
machine either halts or does does not halt on the empty tape”.
The intuitionistic counterpart of ACA0 is (equivalent to) intuitionistic
RCA0 + φ↔W (φ) + for arithmetical formulas φ, ¬¬∀n(φ(n)∨¬φ(n)). Fi-
nally, over intuitionistic RCA0 + φ↔W (φ), the schema ¬¬∀n(φ(n)∨¬φ(n))
is equivalent to the negative translation of the full second order arithmetic
with countable choice. For an overview of the reverse mathematics of the
law of the excluded middle, see for example [Ishihara 2004]; the base system
there can likely be taken as intuitionistic RCA0 + Countable Choice.
We conclude with a principle of constructive reasoning whose (con-
structive) correctness is not provable in ZFC: ¬¬(∀X∃Y (φ(X) ↔ ψ(Y )) ∨
∀Y ∃X(φ(X)↔ ¬ψ(Y ))) where φ and ψ are negative (alternatively, negated)
(φ and ψ may have additional parameters, but all occurrences of X and Y
are shown). Because of the continuity principle, constructive correctness of
the schema is equivalent to classical truth of projective Wadge determinacy,
which is not provable in ZFC. Projective Wadge determinacy is implied by
and probably equivalent to projective determinacy.
7 Discussion
7.1 General Constructive Mathematics
Since the law of excluded middle A∨¬A is a logical truth, one may wonder
in what general sense can it fail. The answer is that constructively, ‘A’ is
treated not just as a proposition to be true or false, but also as information
or knowledge. Classically, for every formula and tuple of parameters, the
formula either holds for the parameters or not, and no further structure
is considered. Constructively, however, true statements are distinguished
according to the information required of them. Logical connectives, beyond
their effect on truth-values, also act on and help specify the information
required. For example, in ∀n(A(n) ∨ ¬A(n)), the information includes for
every n whether A holds. Constructively, one uses ¬¬A to assert the truth
of A without giving the information corresponding to A.
A witness for A consists of all information necessary for A; ¬A holds iff
A has no witnesses. Note that the information contained in the witness does
not include the reasons that the information is correct; for example, a witness
for ¬A just asserts ¬A and need not explain why A fails. Constructively, a
formula with an assignment of free variables is entirely determined by the
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requirements on witnesses. The general meaning of logical connectives is
as listed in Section 2, and in a way consistent with intuitionistic logic, each
framework specifies the details, including what it means to give a witness for
the antecedent. A is constructively true iff a finite amount of knowledge can
be transformed (in the required sense) into information sufficient for A; and
a witness for A supplies that finite information (which can be non-unique).
A constructive justification of A is a classical justification that the integer
specified witnesses A.
Some constructive frameworks have ¬∀n(A(n)∨¬A(n)) for some A. The
reason is that the universal quantifier acts not just on the truthfulness of
the assertions, but also on the information required. In these frameworks,
the information required for ∀n(A(n) ∨ ¬A(n)) may (in a specific sense)
be impossible, which falsifies ∀n(A(n) ∨ ¬A(n)). The classical universal
quantifier is ‘∀x¬¬’, which ignores which information is required, and ‘∀x’
is a strengthening of that quantifier. Intuitionistic logic proves ∀n¬¬(A(n)∨
¬A(n)), so for formulas with the intensional aspects suppressed (including
all negative formulas), intuitionistic logic is simply the full classical logic.
7.2 Constructive Arithmetic
The high complexity of constructive truth reminds us of a key philosophical
question: Are there other acceptable notions of constructive arithmetical
truth? Our answer is no. Other notions such as recursive realizability and
narrow constructive truth may be useful, but they do not meet all of the
requirements. All of the conditions on the witnesses except the implication
one are straightforward. The definition of constructive implication is fixed
through a combination of several requirements. Key properties of implica-
tion must be true constructively, and constructively true statements must be
true. These requirements force us to use non-recursive witnesses in defining
constructive truth. This compels us to provide witnesses like real numbers,
which essentially fixes how the witnesses are given.
Every true arithmetical statement has an arithmetical witness, but the
property of being a witness is not arithmetical. Had we required witnesses
to be arithmetical, constructive truth for arithmetical statements would be
(mostly) weakened yet remain much stronger than simply truth. However,
we cannot do that since we have extended the language of arithmetic, which
requires non-arithmetical witnesses. We cannot place different complexity
requirements (in a truth-altering way) on witnesses for P than for Q since
we may discover P ↔ Q constructively, which can cause inconsistency.
Intuitionistic logic is suitable for various things, and there are differ-
ent notions of constructive, of which constructive truth is just the default
notion. Another interesting approach to constructivity is to use the full the-
ory of finite types, and treat witnesses for statements with implications as
functionals of higher types. A statement would hold constructively iff it is
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witnessed by a constructive functional, and constructive functionals would
be the recursive ones. By using ∀x(A(x) → ∃yB(x, y)) ↔ ∃F∀x(A(x) →
B(x, F (x))) (A and B are negative), every formula would be equivalent to a
list of existential quantifiers followed by a negative formula. This approach
would allow making constructive sense of, for example, what is implied by
∀X(∃nX(n) ∨ ∀n¬X(n)) (the ability to test whether any given real num-
ber is 0). However, for constructivity, we would have to allow functionals
to be partial (in which case B(F (x)) implies F (x) exists) and either non-
extensional or multi-valued, and the semantics is unclear. Also, in construc-
tive arithmetic, computations should be based on numbers rather than on
uncountable objects; so for constructive truth, we have to require that wit-
nesses act based on finite segments rather than on the full witnesses, which
leads to a kind of overspill exploited in Theorems 4 and 7.
7.3 Intuitionistic Analysis
We believe that the uniqueness extends to analysis. Our constructive anal-
ysis is more usable than any other previously proposed. (Compare it for
example with Troelstra’s syntactic treatment of choice sequences.) Our con-
structive treatment of implication allows all real numbers to be present in a
negative form, yet maintain constructivity. The naturalness with which our
framework extends to analysis confirms its correctness for arithmetic.
Some critics may question whether our analysis is really constructive.
However, whether or not it represents an intuitionistic foundational stance,
our analysis is constructive in that constructive truth of statements amounts
to truth of the effective versions of those statements, and in that constructive
proof of a statement specifies through a recursive procedure a way that the
existential aspects of the statement are satisfied. For example, existence of
a non-recursive real number is not claimed to be constructively true.
Our constructive analysis is derived from two choices, and a reasonable
formalizations of the choices. First, we allow any real number in the domain.
We have to allow every real number that might be generated by a physical or
a mental process. However, our analysis is objective and mathematical (as
opposed to being a physical theory), so it has to be independent of physical
laws and of human mental capabilities. Moreover, even under physical laws
as currently understood, many physical processes are random, so not every
physical process is recursive. This compels us to include every real number.
Second, we reinterpret ∀X to mean for all X and with answers given
continuously in X. Here, the key issue is how real numbers are given. One
possibility is that they are given as complete infinite objects. In that case,
computations will have to work with infinite objects directly rather than
through finite codes and approximations. There are several inequivalent
approaches to that, and infinite computation is a fruitful area of research.
However, as far as it is known, humans and (physical) computers work
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only with finite objects, and generally, constructivists view real numbers as
descriptions and as limits of finite approximations rather than as metaphys-
ically existing infinite sets. Through finite approximations is also how real
numbers are obtained from physical systems. Therefore, we require wit-
nesses to provide answers based on finite segments to the sequences, which
amounts to the continuity condition. The continuity also holds in Brouwer’s
intuitionism and (for extensional functions) in recursive analysis.
We hope our paper makes constructive analysis more appealing and its
study more productive.
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